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TRINITY AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS: PROBLEMS WITH DISALLOWING PRPs 
THAT ENTER INTO STATE CONSENT DECREES FROM BRINGING COST-
RECOVER ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA 
Michael Trentin 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Trinity, a case of first impression, the Third Circuit went against its sister Second 
Circuit, creating a split on yet another issue concerning the somewhat infamous Comprehensive 
Environmental Reponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 1 Since the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Cooper Industries and Atlantic Research there has been uncertainty in the 
CERCLA community about whether a PRP that enters into a consent decree with a state’s 
administrative agency has settled its CERCLA liability, thereby qualifying the PRP to bring a 
cause of action under § 113(f)(3)(B) for contribution. 
 On August 20’th 2013, the Trinity Court considered the extent to which a settlement of 
state liability for environmental contamination affects the contribution scheme provided by 
CERCLA, and whether injunctive relief under RCRA is available when a remediation plan is 
underway.  The court held that § 113(f)(3)(B) does not require that a party have settled its 
liability under CERCLA to be eligible for contribution.  
Therefore, Trinity expands the situations in which a potentially responsible party (“PRP”) 
may bring a contribution claim under § 113(f)(b)(3).  However, by so doing, it effectively bars a 
PRP from bringing a clam under § 107(a).  This is because Courts have held that a PRP may not 
                                                                 
1 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 – 9675. 
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bring both a claim under § 113(f) and § 107(a).2  Any expansion of the scope of one of the 
provisions effectively eliminates the party’s ability to bring a claim under the other.  Therefore, 
by expanding the scope of § 113(f), Trinity limits a PRP’s claim for contribution and effectively 
eliminates an otherwise viable (and often preferred) § 107(a) claim.   
 Such a result is inequitable and runs counter to one of the main goals of CERLCA, to 
“assign the cost of such cleanups to those responsible for creating or maintaining the hazardous 
conditions presented.” A cooperating party should not lose its ability to bring a § 107(a) claim 
merely because it has “settled” its State liability.  The Second Circuit got it right by recognizing 
that allowing a § 107(a) claim despite the party entering into a consent order with a state, creates 
a stronger incentive for PRPs to cooperate with state agencies and discourages expensive and 
prolonged litigation. In Trinity, the Court avoided these practical issues.  Instead, it based its 
holding on the theory that a settlement of a state law claim precludes a PRP from being 
vulnerable under CERCLA.  While this holding may seem PRP friendly, it is in fact only 
friendly to those PRP’s who would otherwise and rightfully have greater liability under § 107(a) 
but are able to avoid such a claim merely because another PRP had “settled” with the state.  Of 
course, the word “settlement” is misleading in the CERCLA context. In the real word, the EPA 
or state environmental agency only goes after those PRPs whom they know can front the costs 
for the initial cleanup.  Afterward, those companies are left to chase smaller PRPs who may be 
99% responsible for the contamination.  It comes as no surprise that first PRPs rarely are able to 
extract contribution from these illusive PRPs.  By further denying the first PRP the right to seek 
contribution under § 107(a), Trinity effectively cuts another leg out from under these parties, thus 
forcing them to bear the costs without being allowed a § 107(a) contribution claim. 
                                                                 
2 Infra 
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 This comment discusses CERCLA from a historical perspective paying special attention 
to the evolution of the private causes of action available under CERCLA and the Supreme 
Courts’ impact on these provisions.  First, it gives a brief background of the Statute and its 
general function.  Second, it discusses the historical development of §§ 107(a) and 113(f) and the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Cooper and Atlantic Research.  Third, it highlights the advantages 
of § 107(a) to § 113(f).  Fourth, it discusses the split between the Second and Third Circuits.  
Finally, it argues in favor of the Second Circuit’s approach.   
II. CERCLA OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), codified at 42 U.S.C.A. Article 613 was designed to encourage prompt and effective 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites.3  CERLCA empowers the federal government and the states to 
seek recovery and expenses associated with those cleanups.4  CERLCA is not well known for its 
clarity.  The Supreme Court noted that “[c]learly, neither a logician nor a grammarian will find 
comfort in the world of CERCLA.”5  Despite the statute's shortcomings, however, Congress has 
attributed two primary goals to CERCLA: to (1) to encourage timely cleanup of hazardous waste 
sites, and (2) assign the cost of such cleanups to those responsible for creating or maintaining the 
hazardous conditions presented.6   
The most difficult problems with the Statute arise out of its framework for allowing 
private parties to bring contribution or cost-recovery actions against other private parties.  These 
                                                                 
3 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 – 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) 
4 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) cert. denied,535 U.S. 
971, 122 S.Ct. 1437, 152 L.Ed.2d 381 (2002). 
5 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (US 1986) (noting CERCLA provisions are “not…model[s] of 
legislative draftsmenship,” and its statutory languages is “at best inartful and at worst redundant”); Artesian Water 
Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (“CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision.  It has 
been criticized frequently for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to is precipitous passage.”)  
6Id. (citing, inter alia, Consol. Edison v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94(2d Cir.2005)). 
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private parties are known as “potentially responsible parties”(“PRPs”).  A PRP is a party that has 
been identified as being responsible for any portion of the contamination.  A PRP can fall into 
any of the broad categories under the statute: (1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any 
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, 
agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transport for 
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other 
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity 
and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any 
hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites 
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the 
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for In addition, any 
identified PRP may be held fully liable for the contamination of an entire site.7  Further, courts 
have expanded the list of PRPs to include: successor corporations to generators, transporters or 
former owners or operators; lessees of current and former landowners; corporate officers who 
were active in site operations; active shareholders; parent corporations; lenders; and trustees.8 
Typically, PRPs are identified by the EPA or other state agencies that investigate 
contaminated sites.9  One of the key aspects of CERCLA is that it allows the EPA to bring 
enforcement actions against these PRPs in order to induce clean-up.  Even though the EPA has 
the ability to respond to releases and spills, it generally looks to PRPs to implement removal and 
long-term remedial actions.10  The EPA reserves several remedial options.11  Generally, upon 
                                                                 
7 § 104(a)(1) 
8 57 A. Jur. Trials 1. 
9 57 Am. Jur. Trials 1 
10 Id. 
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discovery and investigation of a site, it will send a “PRP letter,” announcing that the recipient has 
been designated a PRP. 12  The EPA then undertakes settlement negotiations with the PRP, 
usually to induce the PRP to commence voluntary cleanup of the sites. 13  It comes as no surprise 
that the EPA is going to target PRPs who can afford the high cleanup costs, with little regard for 
that party’s actual responsibility or contribution to the contamination.  This is in fact exactly how 
the statute was meant to function so as to further CERCLA’s goals, i.e., to (1) encourage timely 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites, and (2) assign the cost of such cleanups to those responsible 
for creating or maintaining the hazardous conditions presented.  However, in order to meet both 
goals, and not just the former, responding PRPs must be given a fair chance to alleviate their 
burdens through response actions.   
II.  AVAILABLE PRIVATE ACTIONS AGAINST FELLOW PRPS 
A. History 
 Ever since CERCLA was first enacted, the federal and state governments were permitted 
to bring § 107(a) cost recovery actions against PRPs.14  Cost-recovery actions generally provided 
for joint and several liability.15  However, CERCLA does not expressly provide for joint and 
several liability.  In fact, references to joint and several liability in the Bill were deleted before 
the CERCLA was enacted.16  However, the legislative history indicates that the deletion was not 
a repudiation of joint and several liability; rather it was because Congress did not want to 
mandate joint and several liability in every instance.17  In Chem-Dyne Corp., the court ruled that 
defendants are subject to joint and several liability under 107(a) unless they can show that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
11 See 40 C.F.R. 300.68(j) 
12 57 Am. Jur. Trials 1 
13 Id.  
14 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2006) 
15 See Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. 556 U.S. 599, 613 (2009) 
16 See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 806 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (discussing legislative history of CERCLA) 
17 Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint Nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Actions , 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 
1052 (2011) 
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harm is divisible.18  Accordingly, Courts imposed joint and several liability unless the defendant 
satisfied the heavy burden showing that the harm is divisible or that there was a reasonable basis 
for determining the contribution of its cause to the entire harm. 19 
On the other hand, the rights of private parties were unclear.20  In the early 1980s, Most 
Courts allowed for a PRP to bring an implied cause of action for contribution against other 
PRPs.21  Other courts disallowed such claims in light of the Supreme Court’s refusal to allow 
implied rights of action in other Statutes.22 In response, Congress stepped in, and as part of 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Congress added an express 
contribution provision to confirm the right of PRPs to bring a contribution action against other 
PRPs.  
§ 113(f)(1) expressly creates a contribution right for parties liable or potentially liable 
under CERCLA.  § 113(f)(1) permits private parties to seek contribution during or following a 
civil action under § 106 or § 107(a).23  § 113(f)(3)(B) permits private parties to seek contribution 
after they have settled their liability with the Government.24  The Statute provides that “in 
resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using 
                                                                 
18 United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805-06 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Kenneth K. Kilbert,  41 Envtl. L. 
1045, 1092 (2011).   
19 Kenneth K. Kilbert, 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 1053 (2011) 
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., United States v. New Castle Cnty., 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1269 (D. Del. 1986) (finding that the right to 
contribution under CERCLA exists as a matter of federal common law); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 
619 F. Supp. 162, 223-29 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding in part that the right of contribution is implied);  Wehner v. 
Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (holding in part that the right of contribution is 
implied); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1488-89 (D. Colo. 1985) (finding that Congress intended 
issues of contribution to be determined under the federal common law). 
22 Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint Nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Actions , 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 
1055 (2011)(citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40 (1981)(Sherman Act and 
Clayton Act); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 94-95 (1981) (Equal Pay Act and 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); see also Aviall, 543 U.S. 157, 161-62(2004))).  
23 § 9613(f)(1) 
24 § 9613(f)(3)(B) 
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such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.25 § 113(f)(1), unlike § 107(a), 
confers upon a court broad discretion in allocating response costs among various PRPs, 
permitting consideration of as many or as few factors as deemed appropriate based upon the 
totality of the circumstances and the equitable considerations presented.26 Unfortunately, the 
Statute itself does not provide a list of factors to be used by the Court in determining the question 
of allocation for contribution costs, authorizing the use of “such equitable factors as the court 
determines are appropriate” to reach a just result.27 To inform the allocation determination courts 
generally find it appropriate to examine certain factors, which under other circumstances might 
be deemed more relevant to a liability determination, that are not otherwise considered in light of 
CERCLA's creation as a strict liability statute.28 
For example, The Second circuit “has declined to compile a mandatory list of factors for 
consideration.29  The lack of uniformity concerning the equitable factors is problematic to say the 
least.  Some relief may be found in the legislative history surrounding the enactment of 
CERCLA, which references six often cited examples of factors that can inform a proper 
allocation calculus; those elements, often referred to as the “Gore factors”, including: (1) 
whether a party's contribution to release is distinguishable; 2) the amount of hazardous substance 
involved; (3) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous substance involved; (4) the degree of 
involvement of the person in the manufacture, treatment, transport or disposal of the hazardous 
substance; (5) the degree of care taken by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste 
                                                                 
25 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). 
26 Solvent Chem. Co., 685 F.Supp.2d at 442 (citing, inter alia, Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 429))   
27 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 596 F.3d at 130.   
28 Id. 
29  Nashua Corp. v. Norton Co., 116 F.Supp.2d 330, 352 (N.D.N.Y.2000); see also Goodrich Corp., 311 F.3d at 170 
(noting that allocation is an “equitable determination based on the district court's discretionary selection of the 
appropriate equitable factors in a given case”); Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 429 (“While § 113(f)(1) directs courts 
to allocate cleanup costs between responsible parties ‘using such equitable factors as the court determines are 
appropriate, it does not limit courts to any particular list of factors. The statute's expansive language instead affords 
a district court broad discretion to balance the equities in the interests of justice.”) 
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involved; and (6) the degree of cooperation between the party and state, federal, or local 
authorities preventing harm to the public health or the environment, including efforts to mitigate 
damage after a release occurs.30 The court is not required to consider all or even most of these 
Gore factors, however, when making an equitable allocation under §  113(f); “[t]he court may 
consider ‘several factors or a few, depending on the totality of the circumstances and equitable 
considerations. ”31 
While some courts have considered the Gore factors identified in the legislative history 
underpinning CERCLA when allocating response costs, others have found the analysis of Judge 
Ernest C. Torres in the United States v. Davis,32 to provide a more “real world” construct for 
allocating those expenses, taking into account 1) the extent to which cleanup costs are 
attributable to the waste for which the particular parties responsible; 2) the parties' degree of 
culpability; 3) the benefit realized by the party from disposal of the waste; and 4) the party's 
ability to pay. 33 
Despite the problems with equitable distribution described above, § 113(f) was successful 
in confirming Congress’s desire to allow for contributions actions.  Also, it was clear that 
contribution actions provided only for several rather than § 107(a) joint and several liability.  
However, there was still a problem.  Following the addition of § 113(f), there was considerable 
disagreement over when a private CERCLA plaintiff could bring an action under § 107 rather 
than § 113(f). 34  Where the federal government sued a PRP under § 107(a) or settled with a PRP 
                                                                 
30 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 596 F.3d at 130 (citing S.Rep. No. 96–848, at 345–46) (1980)). 
31 Solvent Chem. Co., 685 F.Supp.2d at 442 (citing and quoting N.J. Turnpike Auth. v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 197 F.3d 
96, 104 (3d Cir.1999)). 
32 31 F.Supp.2d 45, 63 (D.R.I.1998), aff'd, 261 F.3d 1 (1d Cir. 2001) 
33 See Solvent Chem. Co., 685 F.Supp.2d at 442. 
34 E.g., Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Sun Co. 
v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1192-94 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting section 107 imposes joint and several 
liability while section 113 imposes several liability); Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 414-15 (contrasting section 107 and 
section 113 claims). 
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under § 113(f)(3)(B), it was clear that the PRPs only cause of action was for contribution under § 
113(f).35   As one commenter noted, however, some savy responsible parties, rather than waiting 
for the government to perform clean-up and then be sued, had begun voluntarily cleaning up 
contaminated sites for which they were subject to liability.36    
The question then became whether these pre-PRPs could bring suit for cost recovery 
under § 107(a), and thus attaint the joint and several benefits of § 107(a), or were these parties 
still confined to recovery under § 113(f).  Defendants argued that private parties should be 
limited to claims under § 113(f), for which defendants would only be severally liable.37  
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that their costs were incurred “voluntarily” and therefore, 
they should be allowed the benefits under § 107(a).38   
By the late 1990s, however, virtually all of the circuits had addressed the issue and 
unanimously had held that a PRP plaintiff was limited to suing under § 113 and cannot maintain 
an action under section 107(a).39  The primary reasoning behind these holdings was that a PRP 
should not be entitled to the advantage under 107(a), merely because they anticipated suit and 
acted early in order to preserve a 107(a) claim.40  Other reasons were that allowing responsible 
party plaintiffs to sue under section 107 would circumvent the contribution protection afforded 
by § 113(f)(2) to parties who settle with the government and would provide them with more 
favorable statutes of limitations under 42 U.S.C. §9613(g).41    
                                                                 
35 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 20 F. Supp. 2d 326, 332 (D.R.I. 1998), aff'd in part, 261 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2001); United States v. Kramer, 953 F. Supp. 592, 601 (D.N.J. 1997) 
36 Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint Nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Actions , 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 
1057 (2011) 
37 See New Castle Cnty v. Haliburton NUS Corp., 11 F.3d 1116, 1121 (3d Cir. 1997) 
38 See, e.g, Centerior Serv. Co., 153 F.3d at 349-350.  
39 Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint Nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Actions , 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 
1057 (2011) 
40 See Morrison Enters. v. McShares , Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (10th Cir. 2002); Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 
424; Centerior Serv., 153 F.3d at 349-50; New Castle Cnty., 111 F.3d at 1121-22. 
41 Kenneth K. Kilbert, 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 1092 (2011) 
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B. The Supreme Court Steps In 
The Supreme Court upset the unanimity of the Circuits by reversing the Fifth Circuit  in 
Cooper Industries.  In that case, Cooper owned and operated four contaminated aircraft engine 
maintenance cites before selling then to Aviall in 1981.42Some years later, Aviall discovered that 
both it and Cooper had contaminated the facilities when oil and other hazardous substances 
leaked into the groundwater.43  Aviall notified the Texas Natural Resource Conservation 
Commission (the “Commission”) of the contamination.44 The Commission directed Aviall to 
clean-up the site and threatened to pursue an enforcement action but took no judicial or 
administrative measures to compel cleanup.45  Aviall cleaned-up the properties under the state’s 
supervision and incurred approximately $5 million in clean-up costs.46  Aviall then brought suit 
against Cooper under § § 113(f)(1), 107(a), and state law.47  Aviall then amended its complaint 
to combine the §§ 113(f)(1) and 107(a) claims into a single § 113(f) claim.48 
 The question on appeal was whether Cooper had standing to bring a § 113(f)(1) claim.49  
The Court held that only PRPs that were sued under §§ 106 or 107, or had been party to an 
administrative or judicial settlement could rightfully bring a cause of action under § 113(f).50  In 
reaching this holding, the Court relied solely on the plain language of § 113(f)(1).51 The court 
expressly refused to look at the legislative history or policy implications of its holding.52  Also, 
                                                                 
42 Cooper Industries Inc., v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 (2004) 
43 Id. at 163 – 64.  
44 Id at 164. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Cooper, 543 U.S. at 164.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 164-65 
50 Id. at 165. 
51 Id at 166 -67. 
52 Id. at 167(“Given the clear meaning of the text, there is no need to resolve this dispute or to consult the purposes 
of CERCLA at all.”) 
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despite the Dissent’s advice, the Majority refused to address whether Cooper was entitled to a § 
107(a) claim after being denied a claim under § 113(f).53   
This holding shocked the CERCLA community and had result of discouraging PRP 
settlement.54  Not only did the majority refuse to grant Aviall a cost-recovery action, but it also 
left Aviall with no remedy because it refused to decide the § 107(a) issue.  Thus, post-Cooper, “a 
responsible party who voluntarily cleaned up a site could be left shouldering the entire cleanup 
cost burden, without a CERCLA remedy against other potentially responsible parties under 
either section 107 or 113.”55 
 In 2007, the Supreme Court attempted in to clean-up the Cooper mess with its decision in 
Atlantic Research.  In that case, Atlantic leased a research facility from the United States 
Department of Defense where Atlantic retrofitted rocket motors for the United States.56 The 
work resulted in the contamination of soil and ground water at the site.57  Atlantic cleaned the 
site at its own expense and then sought to recover some of the costs from the United States under 
§§ 113(f) and 107(a). 58 After Cooper was decided, however, Atlantic was forced to amend its 
complaint and to seek relief under solely under § 107(a) and the common law.59  The District 
Court then granted the United State’s motion to dismiss relying upon Cooper.60  The Court of 
Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed, recognizing that Cooper undermined the reasoning of the 
                                                                 
53 Cooper, 543 U.S. at 168. 
54 See Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167-68; Kenneth K. Kilbert, 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 1062 (2011) (“Aviall stunned the regulated 
community, causing widespread uncertainty about whether PRPs could recover voluntarily incurred cleanup costs 
from other PRPs.”); Jeffrey M. Gaba, United States v. Atlantic Research: The Supreme Court Almost Gets It Right , 
37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,810, 10,812 (2007) (“[Aviall] rocked the established view of CERCLA.”) 
55 Kenneth K. Kilbert, 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 1062 (2011) 
56 Atlantic Research, 551 U.S. at 133. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 134. 
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Circuit’s prior precedent. 61  The court reasoned that § 107(a)(4)(B) authorized suit by any 
person other than the persons permitted to sue under § 107(a)(4)(A).62  Accordingly, it held that 
§ 107(a)(4)(B) provides a cause of action to Atlantic Research.63 It reasoned that PRPs that “have 
been subject to §§ 106 or 107 enforcement actions are still required to use § 113, thereby 
ensuring its continued vitality.”64 
 The Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the perceived conflict predicted by the Court 
of Appeals.  First, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals allowing Atlantic to bring a cause of 
action under 107(a).65  The Court also reasoned that the reference in section 107(a)(4)(B) to “any 
other person” included parties like Atlantic, who are responsible for a portion of the liability but 
who also incurred costs “voluntarily.”66  In so holding, the Court expressly rejected the 
Government’s argument that section 107(a)(4)(B) authorizes relief only for “innocent” private 
parties.67   Thus, the Court determined that a PRP who may be responsible for part of the 
contamination may nonetheless incur voluntary cleanup costs. 
 Second, the Court addressed issues concerning the “friction” between 107(a) and 
113(f).68  Specifically, the Court took notice of the Government’s concerns that (1) “by offering 
PRPs a choice between §§ 107(a) and 113(f), effectively allows PRPs to circumvent § 113(f)’s 
shorter statute of limitations;” and (2) “PRPs will eschew equitable apportionment under § 113(f) 
in favor of joint and several liability under § 107(a).”69 The Court only partially addressed these 
concerns.  It noted that §§ 107(a) and 113(f) provide “clearly distinct remedies” that complement 
                                                                 
61 Atlantic Research Corp v. U.S., 459 F.3d 827, 830, n. 4. (8th Cir. 2006) 
62Id. at 835. 
63 Id. 
64 Id., at 836–837 
65 Atlantic Research, 551 U.S. at 134. 
66 Id. at 135. 
67 Id. at 136 
68 Id. at 137. 
69 Id. at 137 -38.  
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each other by providing causes of action ‘to persons in different procedural circumstances.’”70  
“As a result, though eligible to seek contribution under § 113(f)(1), the PRP cannot 
simultaneously seek to recover the same expenses under § 107(a).”71 
Nonetheless, in a footnote, the Court recognized the looming problem that a party that 
enters into a consent decree with the government following suit under CERCLA and performs 
cleanup work pursuant to the decree’s terms is neither incurring costs voluntarily nor 
reimbursing costs of another.72  The Court declined to “decide whether these compelled costs of 
response are recoverable under 113(f), 107(a), or both.73  
 By now the reader is probably confused as to the state of the law after Cooper and 
Atlantic.  To summarize, Cooper decided that a PRP who is not subject to a § 106 or § 107 suite 
may not bring a § 113(f) claim.  Three years later,   Atlantic held that a PRP who voluntarily 
cleans up a site may pursue a cost recovery action under § 107(a).  After Atlantic, a majority of 
circuits have not allowed a plaintiff to pursue both a 107(a) cost recovery claim when a § 113(f) 
contribution claim is available. 74 
In Agere, the Third Circuit confronted the issue left open by the Supreme Court in 
Atlantic Research, “whether, in addition to § 113(f) claims, plaintiff such as these have §  107(a) 
claims for expenses sustained pursuant to a consent decree following a CERCLA suit.” 75 In that 
case, the Court was faced with a PRP who neither incurred costs voluntarily, nor were they 
                                                                 
70 Id. at 138 – 39 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 
2005)  
71 Id. 
72 Id. at n. 11. 
73 Id. 
74 See Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1236–37 (11th Cir.2012); Morrison Enters., LLC v. Dravo 
Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 603 (8th Cir.2011); Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 608 F.3d 284, 291 n. 19 
(5th Cir.2010) (acknowledging, and not disturbing, district court's implicit decision that plaintiff could not pursue 
both remedies); Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 229 (3d Cir.2010); Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir.2010); ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, 
Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir.2007) 
75 Id. at 228. 
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reimbursed to another party.76 The court recognize a problem with Atlantic Research’s reasoning 
that “any fear that PRPs will eschew equitable apportionment under § 113(f) in favor of joint and 
several liability under § 107(a) is mitigated by the fact that a § 113(f) counterclaim would 
necessitate the equitable apportionment of costs among the liable parties, including the PRP that 
filed the § 107(a) action.”77  The Court pointed out that plaintiffs that have entered into consent 
decress “would be able to recover 100 percent of their own costs…, even though themselves are 
actually responsible for…a significant portion of the contamination.”78  Refusing to enforce an 
inequitable result, the court held that “costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of §  
107(a)(4)(B), and costs of reimbursement to another person pursuant to a legal judgment or 
settlement are recoverable only under § 113(f).”79  
C. The Advantage of § 107 to § 113 
 Since liability is joint and several under § 107(a), the private party may recoup all 
recoverable costs from any responsible party.  In contrast, because liability is merely several 
under § 113(f), a PRP may only recoup an equitable share of cleanup and response costs from 
other PRPs.   A contribution action is more limited because in determining relative contribution 
of the parties in such an action, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances,80 and the 
court will, therefore, have broad discretion in determining how to allocate costs under PRPs.  
Moreover, a non-settling party who sues for contribution may finds its equitable share of costs 
reduced because, under § 113(f)(2), other parties that do not settle with the government are given 
contribution protection from claims by non-settling PRPs. 81  Another major disadvantage of 
having to resort to a contribution action instead of a private cost recovery action is that the 
                                                                 
76 Id. at 227. 
77 Id. at 228 (internal quotations omitted) 
78 Id. 
79 Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F. 3d 204 (3d Cir. 2010) 
80 Enviornmental Transp. Sys. V. Ensco, Inc., 969 F. 2d. 503 (CA 1992).  
81 Amer. Jur. 
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statute of limitations for contribution claims is only three years as opposed to a six year period 
form cost recovery claims.82 
Kenneth K. Kilbert, a commentator, recognized another drastic advantage afforded § 
107(a).83  Under § 107(a) orphan shares stay orphan, while under § 113(f), the cost of cleaning 
up “orphan shares” of hazardous waste from unidentifiable sources or insolvent parties could be 
allocated between the remaining potentially responsible party and settling defendants.84   The 
term “orphan share” refers to the common situation where multiple parties are subject to 
CERCLA liability for clean-up costs at a site.85  Some of those PRPs however, may not be 
capable of contributing payment because they are insolvent, dead, or defunct.86  This is 
especially common because of the large costs associated with cleanup and because CERLA can 
impose liability for events that occurred decades ago. 87 
After trudging through the complexities of § 107(a) and § 113(f), we are left with two 
principals that are important here: (1) § 107(a) and § 113(f) are distinct causes of action that 
occur procedurally in different places, and § 107(a) allows for joint and several liability while § 
113(f) is limited to contribution recovery from a judgment or settlement; (2) it is advantageous 
that a PRP position itself to bring a claim under § 107(a) as opposed to § 113(f).  With these 
principals in mind, we now turn to the split between the Second and Third Circuits. 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
i. Consolidated Edison 
                                                                 
82 Id. 
83 Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint Nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Actions , 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 
1069 (2011) 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1047. 
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In Consolidated Edison, the New York State Department of Conservation (the 
“Department”) began investigating gas plants in Westchester.88  In 2002, Con Ed entered into a 
voluntary Cleanup Agreement with the Department to clean up more than 100 sites at which Con 
Ed or its predecessors might have formerly owned or operated.89  Prior to entering the cleanup 
agreement, Con Ed sued other PRPs to recoup costs that Con Ed had incurred and would incur in 
cleaning up the sites allegedly contaminated by these other PRPs.90  Con Ed claimed that it has 
spent $4 mil and might exceed total spending of over $100 mil. 91  The District Court for the 
Southern District of New York granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment rejecting 
Con Ed’s claims. 92     
The Court interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in Cooper, as limiting a party’s 
contribution claims under § 113(f).  93 Specifically, the Court relied on Cooper’s language that 
stated “contribution may only be sought subject to the specified conditions, namely ‘during or 
following’ a specified civil action.’”94  The Court read the Legislative History of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act 1986 (“SARA”) to supports its’ reading of the statute, 95  
arguing that “the House Committee Report on Energy and Commerce Accompanying SARA 
states that section 113 ‘clarifies and confirms the right of a person held joint and severally liable 
under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties.”96 (“Because the H. 
Report makes “no mention of any intent to meddle with the contribution rules governing 
settlement of non-CERCLA claims…we believe section 113(f)(3)(B) does not permit 
                                                                 
88 Con Ed, 423 F.3d at 92 – 93.  
89 Id. at  93. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. 
92 Con Ed., 423 F.3d at (Case Synopsis). 
93 Id. at 93 – 94 (citing Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004)). 
94 Id. at 95 (quoting Cooper, 543 U.S. at 583) (internal citations omitted) ).  
95 Id. at 96. 
96 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99 – 253(I) at 79 (1985)).  
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contribution actions based on the resolution of liability for state law – but not CERCLA – 
claims.”)97 
ii. W.R. Grace 
 W.R. Grace can be read in conjunction with the Con Ed’s opinion.  In addition, it was one 
of the first court opinions to address the issue of consent decrees post-Atlantic Research.  It also 
goes into a more detailed analysis of the purpose of CERCLA and the practical implications of 
the Court’s holding.   In W.R. Grace, a landfill owner sought to recover response costs it incurred 
cleaning up a contaminated site in New York.98  In 1983, the site came under investigation by the 
New York State of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”).99  Thereafter, the DEC entered into a 
series of two administrative orders with the owner of the site in which the owner agreed to 
perform certain remedial work and to reimburse the DEC for costs of investigation.100  In 
consideration, the DEC promised a release of liability under New York Law for claims related to 
the site.101  After spending approximately $1.7 million on remedial activities, the owner sued 
Zotos, a fellow PRP, for contribution and cost recovery.102 
The issue addressed on appeal was “whether a potentially responsible party who has 
remediated a contaminated site pursuant to an administrative consent order has a cause of action 
to pursue necessary associated costs.”103  The Court first held that Grace did not settle its 
CERCLA liability by way of its consent order with the State of New York.104  The Court 
reasoned that “the fact that a party enters into a consent order before beginning remediation is of 
                                                                 
97 Id. 
98 W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Intern., Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2009). 
99 Id. at 87. 
100 Id. at 88 – 87. 
101 Id. at 88. 
102 Id. 
103 W.R. Grace, 559 F.3d at 90.  
104 Id. at 91 – 92. 
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no legal significance with respect to whether or not the party has incurred response costs.105  The 
Court recognizes that Grace sought to “recover costs for remediation it performed itself; it does 
not seek to recoup expenses incurred in satisfying a settlement agreement or court judgment.” 106 
 Instead of focusing on the tedious and ambiguous differences between § 107(a) and § 
113(f), the Court instead focused on the facts surrounding the specific actions taken by Grace, 
which the Court determined were remedial in nature despite the State Order.107  The fact is that 
by entering into an agreement with the State to investigate and remediate a contaminated site, 
Grace “saved the parties and the government litigation costs, and presumably also limited 
ongoing contamination by promptly remediating the site.”108  Further, the Court recognizes that 
to deny Grace to a § 107(a) claim would be to “discourage parties from entering agreements with 
the states to ensure proper cleanup.”109  If Grace had not acted responsibly by entering into the 
consent order with the DEC, and instead waited for suit, it would have a cause of action under § 
113(f)(1), but that course of action would have occasioned both further contamination and 
greater expenses associated with the delay in instituting litigation.110 
iii. Trinity 
In Trinity, the owner of industrial site brought action against former owner, seeking 
injunctive and monetary relief from former owner, for remediation of site it was undertaking 
pursuant to court order, and asserting claims under CERCLA. 111 The former owner filed a 
counter claim for contribution.  The environmental site at issue is located at an industrial facility 
                                                                 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 93. 
107 Id. at 91(“The Consent Order at issue here does not resolve CERCLA claims that could be brought by the federal 
government”) 
108 Id. at 94. 
109 W.R. Grace, 559 F.3d at 95. 
110 Id.  
111 Trinity Industries, 735 F.3d at 132. 
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called the South Plant, located in Pennsylvania.112  Trinity acquired the property in 1988 and 
manufactured cars there until 2000. 113  The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection (“DEP”) started investigating the site in 2004.114  In 2006, the DEP initiated 
enforcement proceedings against Trinity, which resulted in Trinity entering into an agreement, in 
which it pled nolo contender to five counts of unlawful conduct.115  On December 21, 2006 
Trinity and the DEP entered into a consent order pursuant to the Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites 
Cleanup Act (“HSCA”) and Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act 
(“LRA”). 116 The Consent order names Trinity as a “responsible person” for the release of 
hazardous substances at the site, but also “expressly reserves Trinity’s right to pursue its cost 
recovery, contribution, and other claims against CB & I.” 117  
Trinity’s claims are based on CB & I’s role in causing contamination now under 
remediation at the site. 118  Trinity had purchased the plant from MBM, a third party, in 1988, 
which had purchased it from CB & I in 1985.119  Trinity alleges that CB & I contaminated 
several sections of the site through abrasive blasting and painting, pointing to Deposition of 
former CB & I employee.120 Immediately after signing the Consent Order, Trinity filed claims 
against CB & I under § 113(f)(3)(B), RCA, and state law, seeking contribution from CB & I for 
its share of remediation costs and injunctive relief.121  The District Court granted summary 
                                                                 
112 Id. at 132. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 133 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Trinity, 735 F.3d at 134.  
118 Id.  
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 134, n.1.  
121 Id. at 134. 
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judgment to CB & I and Trinity appealed.122  The United States filed an amicus brief in support 
of Trinity.123 
The issue that the Court faced was “whether CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B) provides a 
contribution claim where a party seeking contribution has settled its state – law liability as 
opposed to its liability under CERLCA, and whether injunctive relief pursuant to RCRA Article 
107(a)(1)(B) is available where a remediation plan has already been instituted and begun.”124 
The District Court relied on the Second Circuit’s opinion in Con Ed, holding that § 113(f)(3)(B) 
allows for contribution only for claims brought under CERCLA itself.125  
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals chose to go against the Second Circuits’ 
holdings for the following reasons: (1) the Statutory Language of § 113(f)(3)(B) “requires only 
the existence of a settlement resolving liability to the US or a state ‘for some or all of a response 
action;”126 (2)  the Legislative History relied upon by the Second Circuit referred only to § 
113(f)(1);127 (3) the “cost recovery and contribution provisions in HSCA are virtually identical to 
those in CERLCA.”;128 and (4) Pennsylvania law is constructed to comply with CERCLA.129   
Therefore, a resolution of PA Law is a de facto resolution of CERLCA  
Because Trinity sought a contribution claim under § 113(f)(3)(B), and only argued for a § 
107(a) claim in the alternative the court, in a footnote, declined to address whether Trinity had a 
claim under § 107(a).130 Thus, the court refused to address the problems with granting a § 113(f) 
claim but not a 107(a) claim.   
                                                                 
122 Trinity, 735 F.3d at 134. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 135. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 136. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 137. 
129 Id. at 5 (“accordingly, under PA law, remediation pursuant to the LRA is remediation under CERCLA.”). 
130 Trinity, 735 F.3d at 138, n. 5  
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Definition of “resolved his liability” Under the Statute  
 In Trinity the Courts pay little attention to the actual language in the agreement and 
instead focus on the fact that a State has the power to settle Trinity’s CERCLA liability.  
Assuming that conclusion is true, that should not be the first inquiry of the problem.  First, it is 
important to ask whether the Consent Order actually “resolves” the PRP’s CERCLA liability.  A 
settlement in which a PRP promises to undertake certain remedial measures – that once finished, 
are subject to the State’s approval- in exchange for a release of claims is itself not a resolution of 
the PRP’s liability.  It is only after the completion of the remediation work that the claims are 
actually discharged.  Thus, any actions brought in the interim are not contribution actions within 
the meaning of § 113(f).  This subtle, but important distinction is articulated in a well thought out 
opinion in the Seventh Circuit.131 
 In Bernstein, the EPA discovered groundwater pollution at a site that posed a 
contamination risk to the town’s drinking water.132 The EPA responded with a series of Consent 
Orders with identical contractual terms – the 1999 AOC and the 2002 AOC - in which the 
respondents promised to undertake substantial remedial action and to reimburse the EPA cleanup 
costs.133   In return, the EPA agreed to release their liability but not until such conditions were 
met.134  The Court held that only the Consent Orders that were completed and approved by the 
                                                                 
131 See Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190 (7d Cir. 2012); see also ITT Industries Inc. v. Borgwarner Inc., 506 F.3d 
452 (2007). 
132 Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 196 – 197.   
133 Id. at 197-198 
134 Id. at 203 – 204 
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EPA constituted a resolution of liability within the meaning of § 113(f)(3)(B).135  However, any 
Consent Order issued for work that was “ongoing” and without a notice of EPA approval was not 
considered a resolution of liability.  Thus, no § 113(f)(3)(B) claim was available.136  What was 
available was a § 107(a) claim for response costs incurred according to the national contingency 
plan.137  Thus, the Court rejected the argument that the mere signing of a settlement agreement 
amounted to a resolution of liability for purposes of the statute.138 The Court also noted that 
recovery under § 107(a) was appropriate even though the parties were “compelled” to incur the 
costs because of the government’s actions.139   The Court based its findings on its interpretation 
of § 113(f)(B)(3)’s plain language.140  It reasoned that a conditional promise is not a resolution of 
liability.  The Court called for a “look at the terms of the settlement on a case-by-case basis.”141 
Further, the Court discussed policy concerns.  Specifically, the Court addressed the 
EPA’s concern that its decision would discourage PRPs incentive to settle with the State because 
they will lose the “possibility of obtaining contribution from non-settling parties as soon as a 
settlement is executed which incentivizes PRPs to settle in the first place.” 142 The Court points 
out a fundamental flaw in this argument – even though a PRP is not entitled to sue a non-settling 
PRP under § 113(f)(3)(B), it is entitled to sue under § 107(a) cost recovery action – noting that 
“the cost recovery action is subject to a longer statute of limitations, making it arguably the 
preferable recovery vehicle for a PRP embarking on what might well be a decode-long cleanup 
effort, and thus actually creating a further positive incentive to settle.”143 
                                                                 
135 Id. at 204 – 207 
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138 Id. at 208.   
139 Id. at 209. 
140 Id. at 212-213.   
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The same reasoning applied by Bernstein concerning EPA settlements should also apply 
to state settlements in Con Ed and Trinity.  The Court in Bernstein recognizes two important 
facts: (1) clean ups can be very expensive and be drawn out for long periods of time; and (2) §§ 
107(a) claims are preferred to 113(f) claims.  Trinity completely ignores these practical concerns 
in favor of a bright line rule – that any agreement with a state constitutes a settlement under § 
113(f) – without acknowledging that such a rule would actually discourage settlement.  
B. Encouraging Settlement 
 The Statutory Language is ambiguous with regard to state settlements.  As such, it must 
be read in a manner that “supports the principal congressional concerns of ensuring that those 
responsible promptly clean up and pay for the removal of hazardous waste.”144  Trinity’s reading 
of the statute would work against the legislative intent of CERCLA by discouraging responsible 
PRP’s for taking immediate remedial action in conjunction with State Agencies.  
Actions under §§ 107(a) and 113(f) are substantially unequal.  And until the Supreme 
Court or Congress steps in, they will remain unequal.  Under Trinity, the problem of inequality 
makes it disadvantageous for a PRP to cooperate with State agencies by entering into consent 
decrees. Barring a responsible PRP from being allowed a cause of action under § 107(a) will 
discourage willing and capable parties from taking efficient cleanup measures because they will 
be effectively admitting liability and will lose their opportunity to prove their lesser degree of 
responsibility under the strict and several liability standard set forth under § 107(a).  It serves no 
purpose for a CERCLA § 113 plaintiff, who stepped forward to cooperate with the statement 
government to pay for the cleanup of the site and to shoulder the orphan shares as a matter of law 
while recalcitrant defendants are immune from the orphan share burden.   
C. Avoiding Uncertainty 
                                                                 
144 W.R. Grace, 559 F.3d at 94. 
24 
 
Finally, Trinity’s argument that its holding avoids the uncertainty that a PRP faces 
settling with a State Government – which the Court correctly asserts will leave the PRP open to 
further liability- will actually create more uncertainty with regard to State settlement orders.  A 
PRP that chooses to enter into an order with the State knows that it is simply resolving its 
liability with the State (who may otherwise have asserted a cause of action under CERCLA).  
The settlement is not entered into with the intent to relinquish its total liability for the said 
contaminated cite.  Under the Second Circuits framework, the PRP knows this and still chooses 
to enter into the agreement in a good faith attempt to remediate cleanup costs.  Trinity’s holding 
would place special emphasis on the actual language in the Order, which will “turn on the 
semantics of the state program’s title, which will undoubtedly vary from state to state and be 
subject to internal state modifications.”145 
V. CONLCUSION 
The Trinity Court failed to address some of the practical implications of barring PRPs 
from bringing cost recovery actions merely because they have entered into a consent order with 
state agencies. Thus, its holding takes away an important remedy from responsible PRPs.  As a 
result, it works to discourage cooperation between PRPs and state agency in an effort to pursue 
effective remediation.   
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